

Published in Turchin P., Grinin L. E. , de Munck, V. C. and Korotayev, A. V. (eds.), History & Mathematics: Historical Dynamics and Development of Complex Societies (pp. 63–114). Moscow: KomKniga.

Political Development of the World System: A Formal Quantitative Analysis¹

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As the main evolving political unit of the World System is the state, it becomes necessary to begin our article with a discussion of the relevant set of definitions regarding the evolutionary sequence of state types.² Some scholars are "suspicious" to the very idea of identifying stages within any processes; in fact, it is not unusual for them to directly contrast the notion of "process" with "stages" as mutually exclusive (see, e.g., Shanks and Tilley 1987; see also Marcus and Feinman 1998: 3; Штомпка 1996: 238). However, we agree with Carneiro (2000b) that the opposition of process to stages is a false dichotomy, as stages are nothing else but continuous episodes of a continuous process, whereas the notion of process can be used for the development of the notion of stages (Goudsblom 1996; see also Гринин 2006в).

When the development of statehood in the framework of the overall historical process is analyzed, two main stages are usually identified: the ones of the **early state** and those of the **mature state** (see, for example, Claessen and Skalník 1978a; Claessen and van de Velde 1987, 1991; Skalník 1996; Shifferd 1987; Tymosski 1987; Кочакова 1995). However, when we try to apply this scheme to the political development of the World System, it becomes evident that in no way is this scheme complete.

Firstly, if, according to the prevalent views, the first mature states appeared in ancient times (Egypt), or in the late 1st millennium BCE (China)³, how could we classify the European states of the 18th and 19th centuries, let alone the contemporary states? Would they be also mature, or supermature?

Secondly, it is evident that the European 19th century states also differed in the most profound way from the complex politically centralized monarchies of

¹ This research has been supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project # 06–06–80459a) and the Russian Science Support Foundation.

² Within the framework of this article the *state* is defined as a category that denotes a system of specialized institutions, organs, and norms that support internal and external life of a society; an organization of power, administration, and order-maintenance that possesses the following characteristics: (a) sovereignty (autonomy); (b) supremacy, legitimacy and reality of power within a certain territory and a certain circle of people; (c) has the capability to coerce people to fulfill its demands, as well as to change relations and norms.

³ For example, in the *Early State* (Claessen, Skalník 1978d) contributions dealing with Egypt and China (Janssen 1978: 213; Pokora 1978: 198–199) the period of the early state corresponds to the Ancient Kingdom (up to 2150 BCE), whereas for China it is regarded as the period preceding the formation of the Qin Empire (up to 221 BCE).

the Antiquity and Middle Ages (which themselves are qualitatively more complex than the early state) according to a number of other characteristics (in particular, with respect to the administration level and culture, the level of development of the law, and the relationships between the state and society). This accounts for the following statement by Max Weber: "In fact, the State itself, in the sense of a political association with a rational, written constitution, rationally ordained law, and an administration bound to rational rules or laws, administered by trained officials, is known, in this combination of characteristics, only in the Occident, despite all other approaches to it" (Weber 1958: 15–16)⁴.

Thirdly, it would be rather strange to assume that the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th century did not lead to the radical transformation of the state organization, whereas the scheme *early state – mature state* does not reflect this transformation at all.

Thus, it is rather clear that Claessen and Skalník (1978b: 5) had restricted their scheme of the statehood development to the *pre-capitalist non-industrial* states only. Consequently, the first author of this article has suggested to significantly augment and amend the theory of the *early – mature* state (see Гришин 2006а, 2006б, 2006г, 2006е), and has come to the conclusion about the necessity to "insert" between the early and mature state a stage of the **developed statehood**. Hence, we are dealing not with the two main stages of statehood development (the early states and the mature states), but with following three stages:

a) **early states** that are not sufficiently centralized yet and that politically organize societies with underdeveloped social, class (and, frequently, administrative-political) structures;

b) **developed states**, these are the formed centralized states of Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Early Modern period, and politically organize societies with distinct estate-class stratification;

c) **the mature states** of the capitalist epoch that organize politically such societies, in which estates have disappeared, the bourgeois and working classes have formed, nations have developed, and representative democracy has proliferated.⁵ To be more correct we should speak about Industrial, rather than capitalist period, as this group includes industrial socialist states. This has made it necessary to develop anew the statehood evolution theory and to suggest new

⁴ Some scholars even believe that one only can speak about the real states starting from Early Modern Europe, since the 15th and 16th centuries (see, e.g., Белков 1995: 178–182). Vincent (1987) also prefers to speak about the *states* only since the 16th century. There are a number of other scholars who prefer to stick to the same position (see on this, e.g., van der Vliet 2005).

⁵ Correspondingly **early, developed, and mature** states could be denoted as **simple, complex, and supercomplex**. Note that this terminology would correspond to the one suggested for the evolutionary typology of chiefdoms that are also subdivided into simple, complex, and supercomplex ones (see, e.g., Korotayev *et al.* 2000; Kradin 2000). Note also that these three types of states are actually characterized by three different orders of magnitude of complexity as it is understood in Complexity Studies (see, e.g., Lewin 1992; Waldrop 1992).

formulations of the main characteristics of each of the stages of this evolutionary process (see Гринин 2006а, 2006б, 2006г, 2006е).

For each stage we can identify three phases: the *primitive, typical, and transitional states of each respective type*⁶. In the framework of this article the basic characteristics of statehood stages are identified on the basis of the middle phase of each stage (thus, respectively for *typical* early, *typical* developed, and *typical* mature states). The point is that at the first phase (the one of the *primitive* state of the respective type) the polity retains many elements of the previous state type, whereas in the third phase (the *transitional* phase) many of its institutions become "overripe" and the first characteristics of a higher stage of the statehood development appear.

Main differences between the early, developed, and mature states

Early states differ greatly among themselves according to many characteristics, in particular with respect to the degree of their centralization, as well as the level of development of their administrative, taxation, and judicial systems. However, if we look for what differentiates them from the developed and mature states, we will find that the **early state** is always an **incomplete state (both organizationally and socially)**. This "incompleteness" is also relevant with respect to relationships between the state and the society. There were numerous versions of the early states, but within each of them some important elements of statehood were either absent, or significantly underdeveloped. In most cases this incompleteness was expressed in the most direct way, as most of the early states simply did not have some significant statehood attributes, or did not develop them to a sufficient degree. First of all, this is relevant with respect to such statehood attributes as *professional administration, control and repression apparatus, taxation, territorial division, as well as a sufficiently high degree of centralization and written law*. However, in some early states (such as, for example, the state of the Incas or the Early Kingdom in Egypt) a contrary disproportion is observed. Though the administrative apparatus and bureaucracy were rather powerful there, they were imposed upon societies that were underdeveloped socially and/or ethnically. Hence, in such cases it was the *society* that looked underdeveloped in comparison with the state.

⁶ In general, these names are given to the respective phases in accordance with the tradition of Claessen and Skalník (1978b: 22–23; 1978c: 640; Claessen 1978: 589) who identified the inchoate, typical, and transitional stages of the early state. However, there are certain problems when we deal with a regression from a developed to a primitive phase of certain types of statehood. For example, to denote the 18th century developed state in Egypt (after it had regressed from the typical developed statehood found there, e.g., in the 16th, or 11th centuries) as "inchoate" appears to be clearly misleading (see, e.g., Гринин 2006ж). Hence, the term "primitive" seems to be more appropriate here.

The **developed state** is a state that has been **formed and completed, and centralized**, that has all the above mentioned attributes of statehood (among them the professional apparatus of administration and control, regular taxation and artificial territorial division). Thus, the statehood attributes that could be absent within the political system of the early state are necessarily present within the one of the developed state⁷. The developed state was a result of a long historical development and selection, as a result of which those states turn out to be more successful whose institutes are organically linked with the social structures of respective societies that are both grounded on the respective social order and support it. For example, in Russia such states with effective centralization developed on the basis of the formation of the estate society, estate monarchy, the alliance between the monarchs and nobility (and sometimes with cities). The developed state influences social processes in a much more purposeful and active way. It is not only tightly connected with the peculiarities of social and corporate structure of the society, but also constructs them in political and judicial institutes. In this respect it can be regarded as an **estate-corporate** state. Naturally, different states reached the respective stage of their development in different times (see Table 1 for more detail).

The **mature state** is a result of capitalist development and the industrial revolution; hence, it has a qualitatively different production basis. Other differences between the mature state and its predecessors are also very significant. It is bases on a formed or forming nation with all its peculiarities. Such a state is qualitatively more developed in organizational and legal respects, it always has a professional bureaucracy with its definite characteristics (see, e.g., Weber 1947: 333–334), and a clear mechanism of power transmission and rotation. It is also natural that the mature state has qualitatively more developed and specialized institutions of administration and control. The mature state was also gradually transformed from an estate-class state into a purely class one; and in its final stages it evolves into a social state. Thus, **in the Antiquity and Middle Ages there were no mature states, but only early and developed ones.** The first mature states could only appear in the late 17th and 18th centuries.

The above mentioned evolutionary types of states differ among themselves by a number of other characteristics. In particular, it appears necessary to pay attention to these differences with respect to the interaction between *centralized*

⁷ Naturally, the notion of "developed" state is rather conventional. It can only be regarded as developed in comparison with the less complex ("early") state, whereas it appears underdeveloped when compared with the more complex ("mature") statehood. Thus the Russian state in the age of Ivan the Terrible appears rather developed when compared with the Muscovy Principality of Ivan Kalita and his successors. However, it does not stand any comparison even with the empire of Peter the Great. However, the state of Peter I looks rather primitive in comparison with, say, the Russian Empire in the late 19th century. To denote the three stages of the statehood evolution one may also use the terminology (mentioned in note 5 above) suggested by the second author of this article: the simple (early) state – the complex (developed) state – the supercomplex (mature) state. However, this terminology also has its own limitations.

power, the elite, and the commoners ("population"). This point that is important by itself acquires an especial theoretical significance, because the interaction model of *state – elite – commoners* is used rather productively in the demographic-structural theory that analyzes the dynamics of internal processes in preindustrial and early industrial societies, as well as the interaction between the elements of this structure in conditions of population growth and the resource deficits produced by this growth (see, e.g., Goldstone 1991; Turchin 2003, 2005a; Нефедов 2005; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006).

In the present article, the model of interaction for the triangle CENTER – ELITE – COMMONERS (PEOPLE) within each evolutionary type of state can be only presented as short descriptions of the most typical situations (see Гринин 2006а for more detail)⁸. These schemes look as follows.⁹

In the **early state** we frequently observe a situation where the elites, basing themselves on their resources (lands, clients, military force) or their special position (as recognized representatives of certain lineages or dynasties, heads of tribal formations and so on), control, in some way or another, a very large part of the territory of a respective country, or even most of it. The commoners find themselves under the jurisdiction and effective control of the elites and they are required to perform state duties. A considerable part of the commoner population (especially serfs, slaves and so on) find themselves altogether out of the state's jurisdiction. Within such situations the center turns out to be actually an aggregate of the forces of the elites (both regional elites and the ones represented in the capital). Frequently the center cannot organize the main functions of the state without the elites, because the state does not possess yet the necessary apparatus, or this apparatus is rather weak. Thus, **the interrelations between the commoner population and the center are mediated by the elites to a very considerable degree.** As a result, the elites take control of the territorial-functional institutions, in particular the fixation of duties, tax collection, judiciary, organization of military forces and defense, land distribution (this is frequently combined with the elites' immunity and autonomy as a sort of payment for the performance of such functions). We can mention as examples of such early states the feudal states of Europe, such as the Frankish state in the 8th – 10th centuries, England (both before the Norman conquest and some time after it), German states in the 10th – 15th centuries, Kievan Russia and Muscovy up to the age of Ivan III. This is typical for many ancient and medieval states outside Europe (for example, for Mesopotamia after Hammurabi, for the Hittite

⁸ The analysis of other (by far less typical) models of the interaction between the center, the elites, and the populace in the early, developed, and mature states goes beyond the scope of the present article.

⁹ Some of the points presented below have found further elaboration in Malkov's article in the Russian version of this Almanac.

Kingdom, for Chou China, considerable parts of the Japanese history, and so on).¹⁰

In **the developed state** the elites are significantly more integrated in the state system, thus they are much more connected to the center. In comparison with the early state, the developed state possesses a considerably larger and much more sophisticated administration apparatus. However, it is only represented systematically in the center, whereas at the periphery it is rather fragmentary. That is why here the elites still act as a component of the regional state apparatus, especially with respect to the military functions, but also frequently with regards to general administration, taxation, judiciary, religious subsystem and so on (see, e.g., note 41). In particular, large landowners frequently performed taxation, judiciary and administrative functions; the taxes were collected by tax-farmers and the police functions would be performed by representatives of special social groups (for example, in the Ottoman provinces they were performed by the Janissaries [see, e.g., Kimche 1968: 455]).

This point does not contradict the idea that the developed state is more organically connected with the society than the early one does. Within the developed state the relations between the center and the commoners are **both direct and indirect**, that is, they are partly mediated by the elites, but partly these relations are conducted directly through the formal and official **local** state apparatus. In the meantime the commoners rely more and more on the center as a possible protector against the arbitrariness of the local elites, which is much less typical for the early state.

In **the mature state** its administrative-bureaucratic apparatus becomes quite systemic and complete, which makes it possible for the center to conduct its interaction with the commoner population directly. In the mature state it appears more accurate to speak about the interrelations between the elites, the populace, and the *state* (rather than the *center*). We observe the relationships between the state and the elite becoming **civil**. This means that the elites (that is, large-scale landowners, businessmen, financiers, as well as the intellectuals' elite) stop performing the direct functions of the state structures, these functions are now performed almost entirely by the formal, official state organs; that is, the elites can be regarded as a part of the civil society, no longer as a part of the state. However, the elites' privileges and status are still protected by the state. All these contribute to the formation of civil society. **The relationships between the state and the populace are direct and immediate** both through the state apparatus (for example, through taxation or judicial organs), and through the participation of the populace in elections.

¹⁰ Even in the early states with a relatively strong center we observe frequently a situation described by Claessen and Oosten (1996): "The ruler and the elite in the centre favour centralization and the establishment and maintenance of centralized power, while local elites favour decentralization. In practice these efforts are frequently characterized by the pursuit of a 'balance of power' policy and competition for important offices, rather than by the dominance by the central ruler over the dignitaries of the state".

Summing up it may be said that in the early state the center only unites (quite weakly) the territories and populations through the mediation of the elites that provide most of the direct interaction with the populace; in the developed state the center directly or indirectly integrates the elites into the state apparatus, limits the elites' influence on the populace, establishes some direct relations with the populace; the mature state (with the help of a rather sophisticated administrative apparatus and elaborated legal system that it possesses) eliminates the administrative-territorial control of the elites over the populace, transforms the elites into a part of the civil society, and establishes systematic direct links between the state and the populace.

Political Evolution of the World System

As is well known, within the World System the first states appeared in the 4th and early 3rd millennia BCE (see, e.g., Виноградов 2000: 150–151; Дьяконов 2000: 45–56; Baines and Yoffee 1998: 199; Wright 1977: 386; 1998), though the dates differ depending on various historical and archaeological reconstructions; of course, they also depend on the definition of the state used by different scholars. During the subsequent millennium and a half the main trend of the World System political evolution was connected with the transformation of non-state polities into the states or their parts (for more detail see the next article in this Almanac). However, to understand the real complexity of the World System political structure in this period it is necessary to take into account the presence (in addition to early states and pre-state polities) of **early state analogues**, i.e., polities that were comparable with early states according to their complexity and functions, but that differed from the state by some characteristics of their political and administrative organization¹¹. Then, in the late 3rd mil-

¹¹ The first author of this article has suggested subdividing all the pre-state societies into two groups: the *structurally* pre-state societies, and the *historically* pre-state ones (Гринин 2001–2006; 2006а, 2006б, 2006д, 2006з; Grinin 2003, 2004с). The former are such societies that due to their current structural characteristics cannot get transformed directly even into the most primitive state under any conditions. The latter are such social systems that already possess the necessary characteristics (such as a sufficiently large size and a sufficiently high level of sociocultural complexity), that is why they can be transformed into a state under certain circumstances. However, when such circumstances are not available, they follow their own trajectories and become the **early state analogues**. The first author of this article believes that the early state differs from its analogues 1) by more complex administrative organization; 2) by more intensive transformational activity; 3) by its ability to coerce to fulfill its demands and to change social relations and norms being based on its own tasks and interests; 4) by its higher reliance on formal, judicial, administrative, that is, non-traditional bases; 5) the principles of recruitment for the state service could be different, but they were never restricted to a special position of a given person within the respective kinship network (for more detail see Grinin 2003, 2004а, 2004б, 2004с; Гринин 2006б, 2006в, 2006е). The second author of this article contends that those forms of complex political organization that were alternative to the state could be comparable with the early state (or even sometimes surpass it) according to almost all of the above mentioned characteristics, whereas the

lennium the World System political complexity increased even more. This is connected with the beginning of the transition to larger states, as well as to states of a new evolutionary type.

Within our systems of definitions, the first developed state (New Kingdom Egypt) appeared in the 16th century BCE.¹² However, its formation was preceded (as appears to also have been observed with respect to the early states) by the formation of the developed state analogue a few centuries before (see Table 1 below). The point is that with time some early states achieved such a high level of administrative development that, to a certain degree, they could be considered analogues (however incomplete) of the developed states. We mean such polities as the Third Dynasty of Ur state and the kingdom of Hammurabi in Mesopotamia. In addition to them the first complete analogues developed (for example, Middle Kingdom Egypt). Thus the first rise of the developed state and their analogues took place around the late 3rd millennium and the first half of the 2nd millennium BCE, which can be seen in Diagram 5 below and which corresponds to the first peak of World System urban population growth that is observed more or less in the same period (see the next article by the same authors in the present almanac).

However, for more than a millennium the early states remained absolutely dominant, whereas the forming developed state analogues turned out to be rather unstable. A new and much more sustained rise of the developed states was observed in the middle and second half of the 1st millennium BCE. Furthermore, by the early 1st millennium CE developed states and their analogues controlled a substantial proportion of the World System territory (and also the majority of the World System population lived just within this territory), as the developed states and their analogues included the largest polities of this period (the Achemenid Empire, the Ptolemaic and Seleucid states, the Qin and Han empires in China, the Roman, and later Byzantine, Empire, as well as the Sasanid Empire in Iran).¹³ As we shall see in the next article of this almanac, the

only important difference was the presence of the professional administrative apparatus in the states and its absence in the states' alternatives (see, e.g., Korotayev *et al.* 2000).

¹² Egypt possessed a few features that made it possible for the developed state to appear there earlier than in the other countries (though partial analogues of the developed state appeared in Mesopotamia already in the late 3rd millennium BCE). Firstly, this is the position of the Egyptian mainland as a narrow strip along one navigable river, the Nile. Secondly, this is a very high level of its ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Thirdly, this is a rather long period of absence of any significant external threat (and in this respect Egypt was very different from Mesopotamia). Fourthly, this is the presence of a strong ideology of royal power. Fifthly, this is the weakness of trade and money circulation, which strengthened the redistributive role of the state for a rather long period of time; however, later this point hindered significantly the further development.

¹³ It appears necessary to stress that some states of the period in question that we classify as "early states" were actually at a rather high level of development and could be compared in some respects with the developed state analogues, or primitive developed states. This is accounted for by the fact that such early states were in the highest phase of this stage, that is, in the transitional early state phase when some elements of the developed state appeared (albeit in a fragmentary form). The fact that only a few early states managed to get transformed into developed ones was

growth of the number of developed states and the expansion of the territory under their control correlate rather logically with the radical growth of the World System urban population observed within precisely the same period.

Table 1. Chronological Table of the Formation of the Developed States

#	State	Note	Approximate date of the phase beginning	Marking event	Approximate date of the phase end	Marking event
1.	Middle Kingdom Egypt	Analogue	-2000	Beginning of the 12 th Dynasty	-1700	Beginning of the Second Intermediate Period
2.	New Kingdom and Late Pharaonic Egypt		-1580	Beginning of the 18 th Dynasty	-525	Persian conquest of Egypt
3.	The Third Dynasty of Ur Sumer	Incomplete analogue	-2111	Beginning of Ur-Nammu's Reign	-2003	The fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur
4.	The Old Babylonian Kingdom	Incomplete analogue	-1792	Beginning of Hammurabi's Reign	-1595	The Kassite conquest of Babylonia
5.	The New Babylonian Kingdom	Analogue	-605	Beginning of Nebuchadnezzar the Great's Reign	-539	Persian conquest of Babylonia
6.	The Achaemenid Empire	Analogue	-518	Beginning of Darius' reforms	-330	Alexander's conquest
7.	Ptolemaic Egypt		-305	Ptolemy I Soter is proclaimed the king of Egypt	-30	Roman conquest of Egypt
8.	The Qin state in China	Analogue	-350s	Beginning of Shang Yang's reforms	-221	Formation of Qin Shi Huang's empire

noticed long ago (this point will be discussed in more detail below). We believe that for early states the inability to get transformed into developed states was normal, whereas the ability to do so should be rather regarded as a positive exception. Within such circumstances, on the one hand, the development could continue; however, due to the enormous difficulty of the respective evolutionary breakthrough, such a development could acquire special forms, as a result of which such political systems could reach rather high levels of sociocultural complexity without being transformed into developed states. One of the most salient examples of political systems that overgrew significantly the level of a typical early state without being transformed into a developed state is represented by the Indian Maurya Empire that demonstrated a rather high level of administrative elaboration. This could be judged, for example, on the basis of data supplied by famous *Arthaśāstra* whose authorship is ascribed to Kautilya (traditionally identified with Chandragupta's [c.320–293 BCE] minister Chanakya). Though most indologists treat *Arthaśāstra*'s description of the Mauryan political system in a rather skeptical way (see, e.g., Lelioukhine 2000), the question that we inevitably confront is how its author could give such a convincing description of so complex (and so adapted to the Indian conditions) a state organization if he had not seen anything comparable in reality. Other examples of such "overgrown" early states that did not manage to get transformed into the developed states are represented by a number of medieval polities of the early 2nd millennium CE, e.g., the Khwarezmshahian Empire.

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#	State	Note	Approximate date of the phase beginning	Marking event	Approximate date of the phase end	Marking event
9.	China		-221	Formation of the Qin Empire	the late 17th cent. – 1722	Transformation of China into a mature state analogue in the final period of Kangxi's reign
10.	The Seleucid State	Analogue	-305	Seleucus I Nicator assumes royal power	-64	Roman conquest of the remaining part of the Seleucid state
11.	Roman Empire		-30	Beginning of Octavianus Augustus' reign	476	Fall of the Western Roman Empire
12.	Byzantium		395	Division of the Roman Empire into the Western and Eastern ones	1453	Turk conquest of Constantinople
13.	Sassanid Iran		226/227	Coronation of the first Sassanid king, Ardashir I	633–651	Arab conquest of Iran
14.	Cambodia (Angkor)	Analogue	The early 11 th century	Unification of the country by Suryavarman I	The late 13 th century	The disintegration of the Khmer Empire
15.	The Abbasid Khalifate	Analogue	750	The Abbasid dynasty coming to power	945	The final lost of the real political power by the Abbasids
16.	The Umayyad Khalifate in Spain	Analogue	912	Beginning of `Abd al-Rahman III reign	1031	The final disintegration of the Khalifate, beginning of the epoch of leaders of small polities (<i>muluk al-tawa'iif</i>)
17.	Arab Egypt	A part of the Ottoman Empire since 1525	969	The Fatimid conquest of Egypt and the transfer of the capital to Cairo	1922	Formal proclamation of the independence of Egypt
18.	The Delhi Sultanate	Analogue	1290	Beginning of the Khilji Dynasty	1398	Delhi sacked by Timur
19.	Japan		1392	Unification of dynasty, return of the capital to Kyoto	1868	Beginning of transformation of Japan into a mature state as a result of the "Meiji Restoration"
20.	Korea		1392	Beginning of the Li Dynasty	1945	Liberation of Korea from the Japanese rule. Mature state formation in both Koreas
21.	Vietnam		1428	Beginning of the Younger Le Dynasty	1883–1884	Final French conquest of Vietnam

#	State	Note	Approximate date of the phase beginning	Marking event	Approximate date of the phase end	Marking event
22.	France		1285	Beginning of the reign of Philippe IV the Fair	1665–1683	Colbert's reforms. Beginning of France's transformation into a mature state during the reign of Louis XIV
23.	Spain		1479	Unification of Castile and Aragon	1834–1843	The third revolution, formation of the constitutional monarchy regime. Beginning of Spain's transformation into a mature state
24.	Portugal		1385–1433	Reign of Juan I	1850s	Saldanha's liberal reform
25.	England		1485	Beginning of the Tudors' dynasty	1688	Glorious Revolution. Beginning of England's transformation into a mature state
26.	Sweden		1523–1560	Reign of Gustavus I Vasa	1771–1792	Reign and reforms of Gustavus III. Beginning of Sweden's transformation into a mature state
27.	Austria		1493–1519	Reign and reforms of Maximilian I	1780–1790	"Enlightened Absolutism" of Joseph II. Beginning of Austria's transformation into a mature state
28.	Russia		1547	Coronation of Ivan IV ("the Terrible")	1801	Beginning of the reign of Alexander I. Beginning of Russia's transformation into a mature state
29.	Poland		Late 15 th – early 16 th cent.	Formation of the <i>szlachta</i> "constitution" (the "Nobles' Commonwealth")	1795	The third division of Poland
30.	Denmark		1536	Royal reform in Denmark	1849	July 1849 Constitution. Denmark's transformation into a mature state
31.	USA		1776	Beginning of the Independence War	1829–1837	President Jackson's reforms. USA's transformation into a mature state
32.	Prussia		First half of the 17 th cent.	Formation of the Brandenburg Prussian state	Late 18 th cent.	Beginning of Prussia's transformation into a mature state

#	State	Note	Approximate date of the phase beginning	Marking event	Approximate date of the phase end	Marking event
33.	The Mughal State in India		1556	Beginning of Akbar's reign	1707	Aurangzeb's death. Beginning of the Mughal Empire's disintegration
34.	The Ottoman Empire		1520	Beginning of the reign of Suleiman I the Magnificent	1908	Revolution. Beginning of Turkey's transformation into a mature state
35.	The Netherlands		1579	The Utrecht Unity of the northern provinces of the Netherlands	1815–1839	Final delimitation of the Netherlands' borders; transformation into a mature state
36.	Iran		1587	Beginning of the reign of Abbas I	1925	Reza Shah being proclaimed the Shah of Iran. Beginning of Iran's transformation into a mature state
37.	Argentine		1826	Declaration of the Federal Republic of Argentine	1853	Adoption of the constitution of the Argentinean Confederation; beginning of transformation into a mature state
38.	Brazil		1822	Declaration of independence of the Brazilian Empire	1889	Declaration of the Brazilian Federative Republic; beginning of transformation into a mature state

During the whole of the 1st millennium CE the number of developed states and their analogues fluctuated significantly in connection with the rather well known complex and dramatic events of world history (the fall of the West Roman Empire, the Great Migration, Arab conquests etc.). However, in general their number remained rather small, whereas the territory under their control sometimes decreased significantly. The same can be observed with respect to the world urban population and urbanization rates. All this is rather congruent with those theories that maintain that the 1st millennium CE is a period of deep qualitative transformation of the World System and the whole historical process; the first millennium CE was a period of preparation for a new qualitative (and quantitative) breakthrough in the field of technologies and production as a whole (for more detail see Гринин 2003а, 2003б, 2006в).¹⁴


A new qualitative breakthrough (or what the first author refers to as “the transition to a new production principle”) can be dated to the mid 15th century,

¹⁴ We mean the so-called early industrial revolutions of the first half of the 2nd millennium CE; see, e.g., Bernal 1965; Braudel 1973, 1982, 1985; Хилл 1947; Johnson 1955; Исламов, Фрейдзон 1986: 84; Гуревич 1969: 68; see also Дмитриев 1992: 140–141.

though some if its signs can be discerned in the 13th and 14th centuries (see Гринин 2003а, 2003б, 2006в for more details). Taking into consideration the expected time lag, this correlates rather well with a significant acceleration of the world urban population growth observed in the late 15th and 16th centuries. The same dynamics can be traced with respect to the number of developed states and the territory controlled by them (see the next article in the present Almanac).

The subsequent growth in urbanization (caused by the transition to industrial production) led not only to the "victory" of the developed states over the early ones, but also to the formation of a new evolutionary type of state: the mature state, which was tightly connected to industrialization and an industrial economy. The first such states developed in the late 17th century. Yet, already by the 19th century they had become dominant in Europe and the New World (see Table 2 and Diagram 1). Finally, by the end of the 20th century this type of state was prevalent everywhere, except possibly certain parts of Tropical Africa and Oceania.

Diagram 1. Growth of the Number of Developed States



Conceptual scheme of the characteristics of the early, developed, and mature states

Let us present now a conceptual comparative scheme of the characteristics of the early, developed, and mature states.

Early State

The early state is a *category*, with which we denote a specific form of political organization of a sufficiently large and complex craft-agrarian society (or a group of such societies/territories) that controls its external policy and, partly, social order; at the same time this political form is a power organization separated from the population and which a) possesses sovereignty (or, at least, autonomy); b) is capable of forcing the population to fulfill its demands, change important relationships and introduce new ones, and redistribute resources; and e) is not built (basically, or mainly) on kinship principles.

This definition does not mention professional administrative and control apparatus, regular taxation and artificial territorial division as necessary traits of the early state. The point is that in the early states those traits are almost never observed in their entirety. Thus, we maintain that these three traits are necessary characteristics for the subsequent evolutionary type of the state – the developed state.

The state as a form of political organization of the society reflects the social construction of the latter. Our analysis of the traits typical for the early state indicates that this state should be regarded as **incomplete**. This incompleteness implies that there are certain restrictions within the system of relationships between the state and society that block the further development of the early state. These restrictions mean that *such a relationship between the state and society is retrospectively (from the point of view of the evolutionary potential of the respective system) inadequate in comparison with what we observe within more developed systems*. Thus, it is in no way strange (what is more, it is perfectly normal) that most early states never evolved into developed states (see, e.g., Claessen, van de Velde 1987a; 1991; Skalník 1996; Shifferd 1987; Tymowski 1987; Кочакова 1995), whereas those that did usually only achieved this through painful crises and cataclysms that caused a deep reconstruction of the entire system.

The restrictions manifest themselves in different ways. Sometimes the political form of the early state turned out not to be sufficiently tightly connected with the society. In such cases it did not "matter" (for a state superstructure) what it controlled. Take, for example, Central Asia where interstate borders did not get stabilized for centuries, they changed constantly in connection with purely military circumstances and the luck of a new conqueror (this is also rather typical for West Asia and North Africa). As another example, take Medieval Europe during the 11th – 13th centuries, where huge areas were transferred from one ruler to another, and from one polity to another as a result of rulers' marriages/divorces, deaths and inheritance cases.¹⁵

¹⁵ Suffice to mention just one example. In the 12th century the French King Louis VII obtained the largest (within France) Duchy of Aquitaine and the County of Poitou through a dynastic marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine. However, he lost them rather soon as a result of his divorce with Eleanor. A

Europe at this time is an example of a political system with a weak administrative structure. However, we also find such cases of "incongruence" between the state and society when the political system of a state possesses a developed administrative apparatus that is able to control and regulate different territories. This could be observed in Mesopotamia where states frequently changed their borders, grew and shrank in a rather fast way, which was accompanied by a fast dynastic change. However, the principles of statehood remained the same as the bureaucracy easily imposed itself over any territorial configurations.

However, in some early states the above mentioned limitations expressed themselves in the fact that the links between the state and society were too tight, that is, some state form was appropriate only for a given society. As a result such states were incapable of performing qualitative transformations. A good example is provided here by the organization of the Greek *poleis*¹⁶ that failed to transform themselves even when their independence was threatened. "A paradox of Greek history is that its main tendency was the continuous and generally unsuccessful aspiration to overcome the *polis*: it was continuous because of the incongruence of sometime established *polis* principles... with the subsequent social progress, whereas it was unsuccessful because the attempts to overcome the *polis* were undertaken on the very basis of the *polis*" (Фролов 1979: 6).

The first author of this article (Гринин 2001–2006; 2006а, 2006б, 2006г) has identified the two main types of incongruence between the political and structures of the ancient and medieval states.

The first and the most wide-spread incongruence is when the administrative structure of the state is underdeveloped. As was mentioned above, early states did not possess the complete set of important features of the developed state, or had not developed all (or some) of them up to a sufficient degree. In fact, some of these features could be rather developed, whereas the rest were underdeveloped (and some could just be absent). First of all, this is relevant for such statehood attributes as: (1) a professional administration/ control/oppression apparatus; (2) taxation; (3) artificial territorial division; and (4)

few months later she married Henry Plantagenet (Count of Anjou who also controlled within France the Duchy of Normandy, as well as the Counties of Touraine and Maine). Consequently, Aquitaine fell under Henry's control. The further development of events was even more interesting. Since the conquest of England by William, the Duke of Normandy, the kinship networks of the English and French nobility got intertwined very tightly, which led to Henry's becoming the King of England. Consequently, all the above mentioned French territories (stretching from the English Channel to the Pyrenees and exceeding the size of the royal domain of the King of France) fell under the control of the King of England (who still remained formally a vassal of the King of France) (see, e.g., Кириллова 1980: 216–217; Колесницкий 1980: 194; Люблинская 1972: 97).

¹⁶ Note that the second author of this article avoids denoting most of the classical Greek *poleis* (including Athens) as "states" (see, e.g., Korotayev *et al.* 2000).

the presence of written law and written administrative documentation (orders, directives, reports, archives, etc.)¹⁷.

This is easier to understand if we recollect that in some early states we find natural rather than artificial territorial divisions, or such divisions as based on clans, tribes, or local communities (see, e.g., Korotayev 1995, 1996)¹⁸, in some early states we find tribute, gifts, temporary loans rather than true regular taxation, etc. Frequently taxes were irregular; for example, often they were only collected during wars. In some cases they could be absent all together, as the government could have other sources of revenue, such as monopolies on some types of trade (including foreign trade), or some types of economic activities (e.g., extraction of salt and other minerals), special lands and territories whose revenues were used to support the ruler (thus, in medieval Europe revenues of the royal domain were frequently the main source of the state finance); tribute and contributions paid by subjugated areas; compulsory payments of allies (as, for example, within the Athenian *arche*) and so on. In the early Roman Republic a very important source of public financing consisted of revenues from the public lands that were rented out, whereas taxes were only collected in extraordinary circumstances (see, e.g., Петрушевский 2003 [1917]: 86).¹⁹ It was not always the case (especially in the Ancient period) that early states had regular armies, whereas rulers relied on levies as their main military force. Also, police systems were seldom found in these Early states.²⁰

Frequently early states had a rather weak apparatus of administration and oppression. Sometimes this weakness was combined with a primitive character of social stratification, as, for example, could be observed in the European "barbarian kingdoms" of the early Middle Ages. On the other hand, estate-class stratification could be expressed in a rather distinct way, whereas the administrative apparatus was weak and non-bureaucratic, as could be found in Athens, Rome and other states (or state analogues) where professional administrators were either absent all together (and magistrates occupied their positions in turn or by drawing lots), or they did not receive salaries and were elected for short periods of time (see, e.g., Osborne 1985: 9; Finley 1977: 75; Штаерман 1989).

Such incomplete early states were often just imposed over societies and restricted themselves to military and redistribution tasks, collection of tribute and duties without penetrating deeply into social life. Ancient Russia was such a

¹⁷ It is not infrequent when the social stratification in the early states is not sufficiently pronounced (see, e.g., Мартина 1987; see also Куббель 1973: 232; Томановская 1973: 280).

¹⁸ Many examples of this can be found in Tropical Africa (see, e.g., Куббель 1988: 132, etc.).

¹⁹ A rather telling statement is made by Trouwborst (1987: 136) who notes that the states of the African Great Lakes region did not create a full-fledged taxation system and adds that if they had created it, this could have been the *end* of the early state.

²⁰ It is not surprising that with respect to the early states the data on the presence of police forces are extremely scarce. For example, among two dozen early states surveyed by Claessen (Claessen 1978: 560) he only managed to find some evidence of the presence of police systems in four cases.

state for a rather long period of time as well as many states created by nomads, many early states of Tropical Africa and so on. It was not rare when a young state nourished a vigorous layer of new nobility that stopped taking into account the interests of the very state that had created it and began to shape social processes for on their own. A clear example is provided here by the titled nobility of medieval Europe that transformed service fiefs into private property, enslaved peasants, stripped the kings of their tax-payers and soldiers, and finally transformed kingdoms into nominal entities. Similar processes could be observed during certain periods in histories of many other countries starting from rather ancient epochs (for example in China of the Chou period: Васильев 1993: 187–189; see also Крюков 1974: 14–15; Крил 2001).

The process described above is representative of the *typical* early state phase and turned out to be a period of feudal decentralization. That is why the following statement makes sense: "Political decentralization of the early feudal epoch is not a symptom of the state's weakness, but a natural condition (within the observed circumstances): this was a hierarchicized alliance of vassals and seniors based on a system of personal links that were the prevalent form of social relations in this society" (Гуревич 1970: 60).

In small (and to some extent in medium-size) states the administrative apparatus was usually underdeveloped and insufficiently separated from the population due to their sizes. Indeed, within such a scale many problems can be solved in a rather effective way by means that are different from state orders and controls (they could be solved, for example, by private persons, through the direct expression of the population's will, or through the activities of clans, professional organizations and social groups). Here the growth of statehood was connected first of all with the necessity to wage successful wars, and sometimes to organize foreign trade. An important role could be played by the state in the settlement of social conflicts, as this was observed in Athens, some other Greek *poleis*, and to some extent in early Rome (with respect to the conflict between plebeians and patricians). As a result of such conditions, some features of statehood were strengthened and others lagged behind. The particulars depended on the peculiarities of concrete polities. Spartan, Athenian, Phoenician (as well as Roman and Carthaginian [naturally until the respective polities remained small]) ways are just some versions of such development.

On the other hand, large early states of the imperial type that originated as a result of conquests were bound to disintegrate or to get radically reduced in size. Empires rarely remained powerful for more than 100 consecutive years (see, e.g., Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979). Numerous rises and falls of Assyria in the 13th – 7th centuries can serve here as a clear example of this (see, e.g., Садаев 1979). However, even when an early state was sufficiently militarily strong to keep its provinces under its control for long periods of time, it usually still turned out to be insufficiently developed to integrate effectively its constituent parts. There was usually a pronounced imbalance between the statehood of the center and its periphery (see, e.g., Thapar 1981: 411). The second author of this article maintains that a typical early empire was

a *multipolarity*, that is, a political system consisting of a state in its center and various non-state polities at its periphery (see, e.g., Korotayev *et al.* 2000: 23–24). And such states as republics of Rome²¹, or Carthage were not tightly integrated systems, but rather conglomerates of territorial polities. They possessed systems of special links between the center and every people, every region, every territory, whereas some peoples/communities had more rights, some others had fewer rights, some were almost equal to the center, and some had an extremely low status.

The second kind of incompleteness of the early state was opposite to the first and by far less frequent. We are referring to those states that possessed a developed bureaucratic administrative apparatus while, at the same time, possessing an underdeveloped social structure. Such states lacked sufficiently distinct forms of social stratification (that is, they did not have clearly expressed classes or estates, and lacked sufficiently mature land property relations). What is more, an overdeveloped administrative apparatus could block the formation of a sufficiently developed and stable social system.

Examples of the above situation are: Egypt of the Ancient Kingdom; the Inca Empire; Sumer of the Third Dynasty of Ur (the 21st century BCE, when, in Vitkin's words [Виткин 1968: 434], the state acquired an antisocial form); and the subsequent state of Hammurabi²². Thus, it may be said that, in such states, bureaucracy (notwithstanding all its organizational importance) was an external superstructure over society. In other early states, military nobility with its retinues was imposed over society. However, these elites possessed different methods for exploiting and influencing the society (see Гринин 2006б for more detail).

In the first case weak governments sometimes failed to sufficiently mobilize a country's resources as they dealt with self-willed nobility and local governors; in the second case, the state suppressed the society by trying to restructure it entirely to meet the needs of the state. It took upon itself the functions of resource redistribution and production organizer/controller. Such a state hypertrophy developed within the conditions of a subsistence economy (as was observed, for example, in the Inca Empire). However, an obsession with registration and control could also be found in societies with commodity-market relations if state duties in kind were also prevalent there; for example, the collection, transportation, storage, and redistribution of duties kind are much more arduous and cumbersome than the accumulation of money.

However, overdevelopment of the bureaucratic administrative apparatus within the state of the Third Dynasty of Ur and the kingdom of Hammurabi sharply distinguished them from the rest of the archaic states. Hence, though,

²¹ Note that the second author considers Roman *civitas* as a state alternatives (Korotayev *et al.* 2000).

²² See on the Inca Empire: Березкин 1991; Зубрицкий 1966; 1975; Инка Гарсиасо 1974; Кузьмичев 1974; Mason 1961; Schaadel 1978; on Ancient Egypt: Перепёлкин 1988; 2001; Виноградов 2000; Заблоцка 1989; Брестед, Тураев 2003; Жак 1992; on Mesopotamia: Дьяконов 1983: 370; Заблоцка 1989; Козырева 2000: 83; Оппенхейм 1990: 66, 67.

on the one hand, these states could be considered early states, on the other, they could also be regarded as developed state analogues (we have taken this into account both in Table 1, and when calculating the territory under the control of developed states and their analogues).

Developed state

First of all, it is necessary to note that the developed state is more organic for society; to be more exact, the state becomes its natural political form, though the fitting process could proceed painfully and turbulently. The road to the developed state was lengthy and complicated as the developed state was a result of numerous transformations, upheavals, splits and reintegrations; within these processes there was a natural selection leading to more effective types of interaction between the state and social/ethnic structures. Significant progress in state political, administrative and legal arrangements as well as ideology was needed so that the developed state could appear. On the other hand, a certain level of ethnic, social, economic, and cultural development was necessary as a result of which society becomes sufficiently consolidated socially and ethnically. It is rather essential that the developed state is not only tightly connected with the society's social and corporative structure and formalizes them in political institutions, but that it also influences them much more purposefully and actively.

The developed state is centralized and complete, that is, it has all of the state attributes. Such a state is formed as a result of a long period of development of administration techniques, expansion and professionalization of administrative structures, and the coordination of the state agencies to perform their various designated tasks. Thus, many features (professional administration/oppression apparatus, regular taxation, artificial territorial division, written law) that could be absent in the early states, are necessarily present in the developed states.

Hence, the developed state is *a category that denotes a natural form of political organization of a civilized society (or a group of such societies) that is characterized by a centralized organization of power, administration, coercion and order maintenance in the form of a system of special institutions, positions (titles), organs, laws (norms) and that possesses (a) sovereignty; (b) supremacy, legitimacy and reality of power within a certain territory and a certain circle of people; (c) and has the capability to change relations and norms.*

We have also formulated the *minimum* characteristics of the developed state that distinguish it from the early state.

a) The developed state has more statehood attributes, and these attributes are more elaborated. The developed state has all the statehood features in a rather clear and systematic form: a special professional administration/coercion apparatus separated from the population; regular taxation; and an artificial territorial division. It also always has a written law and a special cul-

ture of written documentation, registration, and control.²³ Such a state cannot rely on levies and has a regular professional standing army. It has a more developed taxation system. Archaic duties and revenues (tribute, gifts, labor-rents, revenues from state-sponsored plundering and contributions) disappear, or play subordinate roles. Taxation becomes more regular and ordered.

b) The developed state is an estate-corporative state. The social structure of the developed state becomes represented by large social groups, and not by numerous tiny social layers or socio-territorial units (like autonomous cities or temples with special privileges) as it is for early states. Large ethnic groups develop in place of conglomerates of tribes and small peoples. As a result, society becomes sufficiently consolidated socially. The estate consolidation is connected with a decline in the isolation of areas and territories, with economic unification of the society, and with more intensive contacts within the elites representing different parts of a country. With respect to states one cannot help but notice that the activities of a developed state are directed toward the legal shaping of estates, at making the society more stable, at ordering social mobility. On the other hand, both the state structure and its policies reflect the peculiarities of its social (and ethnic) composition; the state actively influences the social structure of society and acts as an intermediary between various estates/corporations. We can frequently observe a process of more distinct shaping of the system of titles and officials' ranks (in the latter case it is especially relevant when the ruling class is identical with the officials' corporation (what is denoted as "state-class" by Cheshkov [Чешков 1967: 243–245]).

c) The developed state is always a centralized state; generally, it is much more durable and stable than the early state. The developed state cannot be a political conglomerate, as was frequently the case with respect to early states. This is not just a set of territories that disintegrate as soon as the central power weakens. Of course, the disintegration can be experienced by the developed states rather regularly (especially, during the transition from primitive to typical developed statehood²⁴). However, if the further development of such a state occurs it is always connected with a new and tighter form of centralization within more or less the same territory. This is accounted for by the fact that the state is formed within a definite, historically prepared (both materially and culturally) territory with a common culture, ideology, writing, and with the development of communications, trade, a certain unification of money types, measures, law, and so on. Hence, the higher the level of statehood devel-

²³ Note that it was not infrequent when in the early states (even when the writing was available) not all the state acts were written. Many (and sometimes most) acts remained oral. For example, according to Jacques Le Goff (Ле Гофф 1992: 45), this was the case in the empire of Charlemagne.

²⁴ They were also regularly observed at the end of political-demographic cycles. It should be noted that pre-industrial socio-demographic cycles usually ended with a political-demographic collapse, after which a new cycle normally began (see, e.g., Turchin 2003; Nefedov 2004; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b).

opment, the more stable it is with respect to the destabilizing influence of various crises (including the socio-demographic crises), and the faster is its transition to the recovery growth phase (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khal-tourina 2006)²⁵.

d) The developed state is characterized by a more developed economic base. In particular, unlike the early state, the developed state cannot form without cereal production (let alone the fact that it cannot develop on the basis of animal husbandry), whereas some early states (first of all in Tropical Africa) were formed on the basis of such agriculture domesticates as yams, bananas, manioc, peanuts etc. (see, e.g., Бондаренко 1995: 103). The developed state cannot fail to possess an internal market, it cannot be based on subsistence economy, unlike some early states (e.g., the Inca Empire, or Egypt of the Early Kingdom period). At least some development of market relations is necessary. There should be not only some craft specialization, but also some regional specialization, that is an integrated economic organism should start its formation within the state.²⁶

e) Many early states existed in the form of barbarian societies, whereas the developed state can only be based on a civilized society. That is why such states only develop in the areas of rather advanced civilizations (and frequently on the basis of leading ethnic groups).

f) The developed state conforms significantly better than the early state to the definition of the state as **an organization of coercion functioning in order to keep the lower classes under the domination of the higher classes and to secure the exploitation of the former by the latter**. The social role of the state changes. The developed state, being an estate-corporative state with a stable social order, performs its role of an organizer of coercion much more effectively than the early state; this coercion serves the interests of upper strata (classes) in a more effective way, which makes it possible for them to exploit the lower strata and to keep them under a tight control,²⁷ whereas in many early

²⁵ However, the transition to the mature statehood (or the transition from a primitive mature state to a typical mature one) was quite frequently connected with profound social upheavals, social and political revolutions, as this was observed in England, France, Russia and other countries, whereas sometimes such crises resulted in temporary state breakdowns, as this happened, for example, in China in the first half of the 20th century.

²⁶ On the formation of such a market, for example, in Russia, China, Japan, and England see respectively Преображенский 1967: 25–28; Хромов 1988: 148–152; Симоновская, Лапина 1987: 119; Гальперин 1958: 27; Кузнецов и др. 1988: 115; Винокуров 1993: 48; Лавровский, Барг 1958: 72.

²⁷ In fact, Claessen and Skalnik emphasized this point when they noted that the mature state becomes an instrument in the hands of the social class of the owners of land and other means of production (Claessen and Skalnik 1978a: 634). However, this emphasis on the private ownership of the means of production replicates the mistake of vulgar Marxism that insisted on the presence of economic classes in all the complex agrarian societies, whereas in most of them the private ownership of land played a subordinate role that was not so important in comparison with a person's position within the state hierarchy.

states exploitation was not very pronounced (see, *e.g.*, Trouwborst 1987: 131; Service 1975). As the state itself takes the functions of maintaining social order, it reduces the possibilities of the upper strata to solve the problems of coercive support of their position by themselves; for example, through the prohibition for them to have their own armed forces, to build castles and fortresses, to apply certain coercive measures to those dependant on them (which increases the importance of law-courts and state administration. This (in addition to other factors) contributes to the more pronounced role of the state coercion with respect to various social groups in the developed state, as compared with the early one.

g) The presence of a new type of state ideology and/or religion. Political ideology in the wide sense of this term develops in place of primitive ideas of royal power (based on notions of mythical ancestors, royal supernatural capabilities and so on). A telling example is provided here by the Confucianism in China (Васильев 1983; Лапина 1982). However, such an ideology usually had certain religious forms, like the 16th century Russian treatment of Moscow as "the Third Rome" (see Пайпс 1993: 306–307). As a result, in many developed states (as was observed in China and other East Asian countries according to Martynov [Мартынов 1982: 6–7]) the state became sacred by itself. In areas with church-type organization of major confessions this demanded an alliance between the state and the official church (with respect to some European states see, *e.g.*, Ле Руа Ладюри 2004: 8).

It is quite natural that different states entered the developed state phase in different ages. Hence, it makes sense to outline a chronology of concrete states entering this phase (a more comprehensive [but less detailed] chronology can be found in Table 1). However, the indicated dates refer to the beginning of the transition into developed statehood, with the main transformations taking place later, sometimes much later²⁸. For example, the Roman state reached this level by the late 1st century BC, with the formation of the emperor's power. However, it is only by the late 3rd century that the Roman Empire distinctively demonstrates all the features of the developed state. In this case those distinctive features are manifested in a "hierarchical system of estates, hereditary ascription of people to their professions and statuses, a huge elaborated police-bureaucratic apparatus, 'theocratic' power of the Emperor, the state religion that was obligatory for all the subjects and that sanctioned the official ideology" (Штаерман 1968: 659; see also Петрушевский 2003).

In a few cases it appears possible to speak about the beginning of the initial phase of the developed state only retrospectively, taking into consideration the

²⁸ In Table 1 for the sake of formalization we had to connect such transformation to certain dates, which, of course, oversimplifies the situation, as it is quite clear that such serious transformation could not take place within a single year (however important it was), but usually occurred in the span of decades. In addition to this, some of the dates are disputed; yet we did not find it appropriate to discuss various hypotheses on concrete dates within the present context.

further evolution of the respective state. Such changes are described by Lukonin (Луконин 1987: 141, 137) with respect to Iran in the following way: "The early Sassanid monarchy in its essence was not very much different from the Parthian one, however, the changing circumstances helped to gradually centralize the state. The *polis* is replaced with the 'royal city', the system of semi-independent kingdoms is replaced with the unified state administrative system, the religious tolerance of the Parthian kings and multiplicity of religions are replaced with the unified state religion – Zoroastrianism....The Sassanid period is characterized by a constantly growing tendency towards centralization".

Egypt entered the developed state phase at the beginning of the New Kingdom Age in the 16th century BCE. In this period we observe major changes in the Egyptian economy as it becomes more intensive and productive, among other things through the use of a new type of plough, hydraulic devices, and the execution of large-scale irrigation projects. There is a considerable progress in crafts, proliferation of bronze tools, development of private property and trade (Виноградов 2000а: 370–372; Перепелкин 2001: 259–280). In fact, it was just at this time when the evidence on market transactions and commodity exchange appeared and became numerous, when silver began to supplant grain in the function of money, though incompletely (see, e.g., Монтэ 1989: 167–168). Considerable changes also took place in socio-political life (Виноградов 2000а: 370–372; Перепелкин 2001: 259–280). Centralization increased and the monarch's autonomy decreased radically. A large military empire was created, which was accompanied by the formation of new layers of state administrators (in particular, military and civil administrators of a new type) and a redistribution of material resources in their favor. The working population became freer compared to the "king's servants" of the Middle Kingdom Age, though many things regarding agrarian relations during this period remain unclear, including information about what rights peasants had with respect to the land they tilled and how they were connected to the land itself (Стучевский 1982: 118; 1966). Within the New Kingdom we see quite a clear formation of corporate structure and a higher separation (including the hereditary character of the occupations) of various social strata: priests, warriors, craftsmen of different specializations, which became even more pronounced in subsequent epochs. This brought the structure of Egyptian society closer to the structure of estate societies and, as we have mentioned, the presence of large all-state estates is a very important feature of the developed states.

China reached this stage as a result of its first unification in the late 3rd century BCE under Qin Shi Huang²⁹. Changes that had taken place in the country

²⁹ However, in a few Chinese states of the Zhenguo period (especially within the Qin state itself [that became the unification core]), as a result of the legist reforms (with respect to Qin these are the Shang Yang reforms of the 350s BCE), we can observe a sort of transition to polities that can be already regarded as developed state analogues (see Table 1). Note that we have taken this point into account below when we calculated the sizes of the territory under the control of the developed states and their analogues.

were enormous, as Qin Shi Huang's reforms had changed the administrative system and territorial division of the country. These reforms unified legislation, the writing system, and the system of measures and weights; the money system was reformed, the Great Wall was completed, and so on. These reforms also led to enormous social transformations (Крюков, Переломов и др. 1983: 17–21; Переломов 1962).

Byzantium was a developed state from the very beginning, because the Roman tradition was not interrupted there. Thus, it is not strange that in comparison with contemporary Barbarian kingdoms, Byzantium stood apart from the point of view of its regular and unified legislation and legal systems. According to some estimates, by the 6th century the population of the Byzantine empire reached 50–65 million (Удальцова 1988: 34, 15).

By the 3rd century CE, Iran can already be regarded as a developed state with the consolidation of the Sassanid dynasty. Already since the reign of the first Sassanid king, Ardashir I (227–241), major transformations took place in this country (they were caused both by purposeful governmental actions and spontaneous social processes); these transformations included the abolishment of the vassal kings and their replacement with governors, the strengthening of centralization, adoption of a new religion, formation of new estates, reform of the territorial division, change of ethnic characteristics of the population, linguistic and cultural consolidation of the country (Луконин 1987; Новосельцев 1995: 24, 31; see also Фрай 1972; Колесников 1987). Note for example, that the Shahinshah appointed the heads of the four estates, which comprised the nation, at the level of the whole state (Колесников 1987: 185).

It may be suggested that Japan entered the developed state phase by the early 15th century, when *Shōguns* of the Ashikaga dynasty managed to strengthen their control over centralized power and, as a result, they came close to being in the position of absolute rulers of the country, though the period of their real power was not long (Толстогоузов 1995: 561; Кузнецов и др. 1988: 89)³⁰. Centralization attempts were undertaken in Japan already since the 12th century, which among other things manifested themselves in the formation of the very institution of shogunate (1192 CE). However, it was only in the 15th century when one could detect contours of the socio-political system that reached its maturity two centuries later, during the Tokugawa shogunate: a deified Emperor who does not actually rule; concentration of real power by the *Shōgun*; his reliance on the military servant estate of the *samurai*; concentration of regional power by the local rulers (*daimyō*) who, however, were controlled by the *Shōgun* in a variety of ways. Naturally, the overall system was based on resources extracted from the tax-paying estates of peasants, craftsmen, and merchants. The *samurai* estate was already formed, to a sufficient degree by the

³⁰ As this happened frequently at the first phase of the developed statehood, the political centralization declined some time later, and the internal warfare started. The second phase of centralization was over by the late 16th century.

14th century when it was finally separated from the peasantry, whereas the *daimyō* estate began its formation just in the 15th century (Кузнецов и др. 1988: 73, 89; Спекаковский 1981: 12–17).

France entered this phase in the late 13th century during the reign of Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314)³¹. By this time in France, due to the activities of his predecessors and favorable economic development, we observe the formation of a sufficiently developed administrative apparatus, a taxation system, court system, and the general strengthening of the state. The royal domain had significantly grown, though the level of political centralization was still rather low. We can also observe the formation of estates and their political representation (*les états généraux*) (Люблинская 1972: 94–109; Цатурова 2002: 12–13; Hay 1975: 138). However, the Hundred Years' War retarded the process of the French statehood development. Afterwards, since the first half of the 15th century, they had to restart the political centralization process from an extremely low benchmark, when the main issue was the very survival of France and her French king (Hay 1975: 153–160).

Spain entered this phase in the late 15th century (as a result of the union of Castile and Aragon). The joint reign of Ferdinand and Isabella (1479–1504) was a turning point in Spanish history. They managed to unite the country, to strengthen the order within it, to undertake important reforms, to establish an effective control over nobility, though its strength had not been eliminated till the end (Johnson 1955: 105–106). The discovery and colonization of the New World accelerated the development of Spain.

England entered this phase in the late 15th century and the early 16th century (after the end of the War of the Roses and the Tudor dynasty coming to power). It was already Henry VII (1485–1509) who achieved much with respect to the political centralization of the country; in general, as a result of the Tudor dynasty reign that lasted more than a century, a new political system (absolute monarchy) formed and flourished in England (see Дмитриева 1993: 163), though English absolutism was significantly different from its French (let alone Russian) counterpart (см. Сапрыкин 1991: 207–208; Карев 1993: 160–161).

For many European countries the 16th century was a "period of state construction" (Elliott 1974: 80). But this century also served as a turning point for the political evolution of such countries as Russia, India and Iran. In Russia the developed state formed in the second half of the 16th century during the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1547–1584). Changes in political and social life of Russia that took place in this period are well known. Ivan revised the law code (known as *Sudebnik*), created a standing army (the *streltsy*). He reformed the central and regional administration by establishing the *Zemsky Sobor* (a legislative body of parliamentary type), the council of the nobles (known as the Chosen

³¹ He became famous because of his confiscation of the huge assets of the Knights Templar (*Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici*), and the movement of the official seat of papacy to Avignon.

Council), the local self-government in rural regions. Then he annexed the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates (see, e.g., Шмидт 1999).

In India the developed state formed some time after the creation of the Mughal Empire, in the second half of the 16th century, during Akbar's reign. In contrast to its predecessor, the Delhi Sultanate (the 13th and 14th centuries) a number of whose achievements were applied within the Mughal state, the latter was a much stronger and more centralized empire³². Akbar who ruled for half a century (1556–1605), united under his rule the main part of the Indian territory and conducted important reforms of state administration that in many respects continued the line of Akbar's grandfather, Babur (Азимджанова 1977:152). However, the further development of Indian statehood met with considerable difficulty, though in some respects (in particular with respect to the elaboration of the administrative system) it reached a considerable degree of maturity (see, e.g., Ашрафян 1987: 230). India remained at the level of a primitive developed state, and, as a result of the long and cruel reign of Akbar's grandson, Aurangzeb, (1658–1707), the Mughal Empire began to decline and virtually self-destructed (Антонова 1979: 213–225, 233–241).

An inability for further development also manifested itself in Iran. After centuries of foreign rule, crises and stagnation, in the late 16th century and the early 17th century, during the reign of Abbas I (1587–1629) and his successors Iran became again a large and powerful state. Important reforms were conducted. At this time we can say that Iran entered again the developed state phase. However, subsequent rulers turned out to be not sufficiently able, and in the late 17th century and the early 18th century, economic situation in the country became critical, trade (including the foreign trade) declined, the tax burden increased, social relations between the populace and state became aggravated, and rebellions began. A political and economic crisis developed, which was aggravated by Turkish and Afghan invasions, as well as interference by foreign powers; these resulted in the extreme devastation of the country and economic stagnation. Even a temporary strengthening of Iran during the reign of Nadir-Shah who became famous due to his successful wars, including the capture of Delhi in 1739, did not change the situation for long. At the end of his life Nadir-Shah himself conducted such an irrational internal policy that after his death the country experienced political disintegration, internal wars, power struggle between various cliques. Iran virtually disintegrated again (Петрушевский 1977; Кузнецова 1986: 229). And as in the 18th and 19th centuries the country

³² The Delhi Sultanate "was a weakly centralized feudal state" (Ашрафян 1960: 74). It achieved the peak of its might during the reign of Alauddin Khilji (1296–1316). However, his huge empire was an unstable military-administrative formation, from which a considerable number of principalities split by the end of Alauddin's rule (Ашрафян 1960: 228). The Mughal Dynasty was founded by the famous Central Asian warrior and poet Babur (from Timur's lineage) who started his conquest campaigns in India in 1519. He conducted a number of important reforms (especially, with respect to taxation) in the conquered part of India (see Азимджанова 1977).

was under the strong influence of Russia and the European powers, its further independent development was greatly hindered.

The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the developed state phase can also be dated to the 16th century. It appears that this transition took place during the reign of Suleiman I Kanuni (the Lawgiver) who was called the Magnificent by the Europeans (1520–1566).³³ By this time we can observe the formation of a sufficiently effective military fief system that provided the Empire with a rather battle-worthy and large army. The Ottomans developed a system of registration of fief-holders (the *sipahis*). Suleiman elaborated it by forbidding the governors to distribute the fiefs and to confirm the rights of the fief heirs. He also conducted a number of important reforms with respect to administrative division, taxation ordering, relations between landlords and tenants. Numerous laws on the administration of various provinces (that regulated administrative organization, taxation, property relations and so on) were worked out. The level of administrative organization also was rather high by the contemporary standards (see, e.g., Findley 1989).

During this time Turkey can be considered to be a sufficiently centralized empire, whose backbone was represented by the military fief (*timar*) system (see, e.g., Орешкова 1986), whereas its center was one of the largest world cities of the century, Istanbul, whose population in 1550 is estimated to have been between 400 and 500 thousand (Петросян 1990: 72–73, 103).³⁴

Turkey was the only Eastern empire that managed for a rather long time (and not always without success) to compete militarily with some European powers and even their alliances.

Mature state

We believe that the mature state (as we define it) is a result of the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution; thus, it has a radically different production basis than previous state types. In addition to this, the transition to the mature statehood (or its analogue) is connected with the demographic revolution. Depending on concrete circumstances it could take place during different phases of the development of the mature state (that is, during its first or

³³ However, it cannot be excluded that the formation of the developed state may be dated to the end of the reign of Bayezid II (1481–1512), or the beginning of the reign of Selim I (1512–1520). Already during the reign of Bayezid II the Ottoman socio-political and economic institutions were put in order, a rather clear religious-legal was developed for them, which was connected with activities of a large group of the Ottoman '*ulamā'*. In general, during the reigns of Selim I and Suleiman I Ottoman state institutions acquired that developed form, which afterwards was considered as a classical standard (Иванов, Орешкова 2000: 76).

³⁴ Note that if the tradition maintaining that Selim I took the Caliphal title from the last Egyptian Abbasid Caliph after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt still had some substance (though it is generally regarded now as the late 18th century fabrication [see, e.g., Sourdel et al. 1990]), this could be regarded as a rather logical measure, as it would have strengthened the power of the Ottoman sultans providing additional legitimization for their power over their subjects most of whom were Muslims (Петросян 1990: 58–69, 72).

second phase, or even during the final phase of the developed statehood). Yet, in almost all the industrialized countries a very rapid, explosive population growth was observed (see, e.g., Armengaud 1976; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006a; with respect to Russia see: Водарский 1973; Нефедов 2005)³⁵.

Table 2. Estimated Populations of Various European Countries from 1800 to 1910 (in millions) (Armengaud 1976: 29)

	1800	1850	1900	1910
Denmark	0.9	1.6	2.6	2.9
Finland	1.0	1.6	2.7	3.1
Norway	0.9	1.5 ³⁶	2.2	2.4
Sweden	2.3	3.5	5.1	5.5
Belgium	3.0	4.3 ³⁷	6.7	7.4
Holland	2.2	3.1	5.1	5.9
Great Britain	10.9	20.9	36.9	40.8
Ireland	5.0	6.6	4.5	4.4 ³⁸
France	26.9	36.5	40.7	41.5
Spain	11.5	15.5 ³⁹	18.6	19.9
Portugal	3.1	4.2 ⁴⁰	5.4	6.0
Italy	18.1	23.9	33.9	36.2
Switzerland	1.8	2.4	3.3	3.8
Germany	24.5	31.7	50.6	58.5
Austria-Hungary	23.3	31.3	47.0	51.3
Bulgaria	—	—	3.7	4.3
Russia ⁴¹	~56	~76	133.1	156.4

³⁵ As is well known, this was the result of the first phase of the demographic transition. The point is that during the first phase of this demographic transition a rather sharp decline in mortality rates is observed. Indeed, when technology starts growing significantly faster than the population (as in the 19th century Europe), this results in a significant growth of GDP per capita, and hence, per capita consumption, improved health care, sanitation, water supply, population health status, growth of life expectancies, and hence the decrease of mortality rates. This is followed by a decline in fertility rates (through the introduction of family planning practices and technologies as a proximate cause), but with a substantial time lag. As a result, for considerable periods of time we observe pronounced trends in the rise of the population growth rates against the background of growing population. This, of course, produces just a hyperbolic effect – the higher the population, the higher the population growth rate. Since the 19th century more and more populations of the world entered the demographic transition. Till the 1960s the number of populations which entered the 2nd phase of the demographic transition did not compensate for the hyperbolic growth of the 1st phase populations; hence, the hyperbolic growth trend was characteristic not only for individual populations, but also for world population as a whole (for more detail see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 92–104).

³⁶ In 1855.

³⁷ In 1845.

³⁸ Note, however, that in order to have a more sound picture of the overall Irish population dynamics one should take into account such facts as that, according to the 2000 census, the total number of the Irish living in the United States exceeded 30.5 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).

³⁹ In 1857.

⁴⁰ In 1867.

It might not be coincidental that Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* was published in 1798 (that is, just during the British Industrial Revolution).

The mature state significantly surpasses the developed state with respect to the complexity and efficiency of its political organization and legal system; it necessarily has a professional bureaucracy, distinct mechanisms and elaborated procedures of legitimate power transition. We usually observe the working out of constitutions and the division of powers, and the role of law (especially civil law) significantly increases. In general (with the exception of totalitarian and authoritarian states), in mature states the systems of law and court procedures reach such a level of development and elaboration that it appears difficult to compare them with the ones of earlier epochs. As a result one of the most important functions of the mature state is to secure not only the social order, but also the legal order, which was often paid little attention by the developed states.

Thus, **the mature state can be defined as a category that denotes an organic form of political organization of an economically and culturally developed society, a system of bureaucratic and other specialized political institutions, organs and laws supporting the internal and external political life; it is an organization of power, administration, and order maintenance that is separated from the population and that possesses: a) sovereignty; b) supremacy, legitimacy and the reality of power within a certain territory and a certain circle of people; c) a developed apparatus of coercion and control; d) the ability to change social relations and norms in a systematic way.**

It makes sense to pay attention to the point that the developed state is defined as a *natural* form of the political organization of society (that is, though the developed state is necessary to sustain social order in a supercomplex agrarian society, in principle, its main agricultural population could do without a state, let alone a large state if there were no threat of external invasions). In contrast, the mature state is defined as an *organic* form of the political organization of a society, that is, such a form without which a respective type of society (and its population) could not reproduce itself in principle.

In the meantime, statehood itself becomes virtually separated from the concrete persons. In the monarchies of the initial period of the mature states a monarch (like Louis XIV) could still claim: "*L'Etat, c'est moi!*"⁴² (note, however, that this was the 17th, not 20th, century), whereas in the constitutional regimes this became just impossible. We could also observe the development of certain autonomy of the bureaucratic apparatus and army that more and more

⁴¹ As Armgaud's population data with respect to Russia do not appear reliable, we have chosen to reproduce Shelestov's (Шелестов 1987: 156, 166) estimates for this country – L.G., A.K.

⁴² Or such claims could be meaningfully attributed to him by his opponents.

act as an abstract mechanism of civil service⁴³. All these serve as a basis for the formation of civil society.

With respect to the relations between the state and society – that is, the state and the person – we find it necessary to speak about the formation of a new type of ideology that can be denoted as **civil** ideology, because it explained the relations between the person and the state from the point of view of the person-citizen who had equal legal rights and duties and lived in a nation-state. As a result of revolutions, reforms and proliferation of education this civil ideology gradually replaced the sacred traditional ideology of the developed state that implied the sanctity of the monarch's power and the inviolability of the estate social order. **Nationalism** can be considered as the most universal type of civil ideology. Liberalism, democratism, revolutionism, and reformism can be regarded as other influential ideologies of the age of classical capitalism. The later period observed the formation of imperialism (as an ideology), communism, fascism, and anticomunism. As a result, the very criteria of the state's dignity changed. The splendor of the Court was replaced with the economic power of the nation, a more just social order, and, subsequently, the quality of the life of the population as criteria for judging the level of state development.

In the mature state, administration institutions, as well as the apparatus of coercion and control, are both more elaborated and more specialized than in the developed state; while in the latter those organs and institutions did not always have clearly demarcated functions. In the developed state both supreme and local administrative organs were often multifunctional and indefinite with respect to their tasks.⁴⁴ Real bureaucracy was only concentrated primarily within certain spheres that were different in different countries (for example, in taxation, or courts of law), whereas it could be absent in the other spheres of life, especially at the level of local government.⁴⁵ And such a situation did not always change immediately at the level of the primitive mature state (cf., for example, the situation in France in the 18th century [Малов 1994: 140]), whereas this is only changed in really systematic way at the level of the typical mature state.

France can be regarded as a mature state since the late 17th century (the reign of Louis XIV). Let us mention just one telling example: by the early 16th

⁴³ Even in totalitarian countries their rigid ideologies, "popular" ruling parties, and other institutions existed formally "for the well-being of the people and society", which restricted significantly the opportunities of the officials' personal self-enrichment.

⁴⁴ For example, in the 16th century in France (as well as in Russia and other countries) we find the "narrow" council of the king whose composition was indefinite and whose functions were rather vague. The same can be said about the representatives of the contemporary administration – *baillages, sénéchaussées, prévôts, gouverneurs* with "their extremely indefinite administrative-judicial and military-administrative jurisdiction" (Сказкин 1972: 170, 171). "Outside the court and government the classical monarchy is characterized by a partial, and sometimes weakly centralized system of administration". The situation only began to change in the 17th century, especially under Richelieu (Ле Руа Ладюри 2004: 15).

⁴⁵ Even in pre-Modern China the bureaucratic apparatus did not penetrate the local level where the administrative functions were performed by the "literati" (see, e.g., Никифоров 1977: 211–213).

century there were 8 thousand officials in France, whereas by the mid 17th century their number grew to 46 thousand (Копосов 1993: 180).

In England the mature statehood formed in the first decades of the 18th century, that is, some time after the Glorious Revolution when a new system of state government started to develop: constitutional monarchy, two-party system, one-party government.

In Prussia the mature statehood had existed since the late 18th century. By the early 19th century "within military, as well as civil, administration it established standards for whole Europe" (Парсонс 1997: 100). In Russia it has existed since the early 19th century--since the reforms of Alexander I and Speransky. In Japan it appeared in the last third of the 19th century (after the "Restoration of Meidji"). The USA became a mature state after the period that is denoted as "Jackson's Democracy" after the name of President Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) when we observe the formation of the two-party system and the abolition of the electoral qualification system.⁴⁶

China can be regarded as a mature state analogue since the late 17th century or the early 18th century (the final period of Kangxi's [1661–1722] reign). This state managed to organize politically an enormous (even from the present-day point of view) population against the background of its very fast (for the 18th century) demographic growth (McNeill 1993: 240–244). During the 18th century the Chinese population grew from 100–150 to over 300 million (Крюков и др. 1987: 61–63; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b: 47–88; McNeill 1993: 240). In Qing China we can also observe a rather high level of administrative technologies, a number of social innovations atypical for developed (but not mature) states (for more detail see Гринин 2006а, 2006 в).

The main characteristics of the mature state:

- a) it is already an industrial or industrialized state in which a unified economic organism integrated by effective communications is formed. The ensuring of its normal functioning becomes a more and more important task of the state. An important role is also played here by military needs;
- b) it has a sufficiently high level of administrative organization, a developed system of laws, or state regulations (as was found in the states of the "Communist Block");
- c) it is based on a nation (or a set of nations), that is why it can only exist within a society with a unified national (or supranational) culture (for more detail on the tight relations between the nation and the state see Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Фрейдзон 1999: 10–12; Гринин 1997б; 2003а: 201–203, 222–235). That is why such a state is concerned with its influence on culture, including control over language, religion, education and so on. Hence, the mature

⁴⁶ Naturally, in the *initial (primitive)* phase of the mature statehood we find some archaic features that are inherited from the earlier epochs, a certain weakness of the state. For example, in France in the 18th century the sale of governmental posts continued, the internal customs remained, whereas in Russia the serfdom survived till 1861. Later such archaisms disappear as a result of evolutionary and revolutionary transformations.

state ideology always includes some nationalism (or some other ideas on the superiority of the given state's population; for example, their special progressiveness, revolutionary spirit, love for democracy/freedom, special historical deeds, *etc.*);

d) in connection with the growth of the role of property relations, the establishment of legal equality of the citizens, the abolishment of estate privileges the mature state is gradually transformed from the estate-class state to the purely **class-corporate** state, in which the main role gradually begins to be played by industrial classes (the role of estates gradually dwindles to zero, whereas the role of property relations and one's place within the state/party system increases). As the class division is mostly economic (see, *e.g.*, Weber 1971; Вебер 2003), and not juridical, it becomes necessary to have organizations and corporations that express the interests of certain parts and groups of certain classes (and sometimes interests of a certain class as a whole). These are various organizations and political parties of both workers (see, *e.g.*, Bergier 1976) and bourgeoisie, as well as other social strata;⁴⁷

e) in the developed states mass literacy was almost never observed, written information sources were controlled by the elites, whereas the mass literacy is normal for mature states were written information sources became available to the general population already in the 18th and 19th centuries and where the importance of mass media grew enormously. This stimulated radical changes in the forms, styles and directions of administration and contacts between the government and the people;

f) finally, the mature state bases itself on new types of infrasocietal links:

- material links – unified economic organism and unified market;
- cultural links – unified culture-information organism;
- national links – consciousness of national unity and development of new symbols of this unity: nation, national interests, supreme interests;
- consolidation on the basis of ideology: cult of law and constitution, cult of nation (or cult of party, idea, leader);
- consolidation on the basis of participation in pan-national organizations and corporations (trade unions, parties, movements) and participation in pan-national elections.

⁴⁷ For example, in Britain the first national federation of the entrepreneurs' unions appeared in 1873; in Germany 77 various entrepreneurs' organizations were created in the 1870s, whereas in the 1890s 325 new organizations of this type appeared (Григорьева 2001: 25) It is necessary to take into account the fact that within the context of a developed class stratification even purely economic corporations cannot remain politically neutral. In particular, the trade union movement with its growth and strengthening "inevitably tries to influence the state and its economic and social policies" (Шлепнер 1959: 386).

Table 2. Chronological Table of the Mature States' Formation

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mature states and their analogues</i>	<i>States in the phase of transition to the mature statehood</i>
1500	0	0
1600	0	0
1650	0	3 (France, Britain, China)
1700	3 (France, Britain, China ⁴⁸)	0
1750	3 (France, Britain, China ⁴⁹)	4 (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden)
1800	7 (France, Britain, Austria, China ⁵⁰ , Russia, Prussia, Sweden)	6 (Denmark, Italy ⁵¹ , Spain, Portugal, the USA, the Netherlands)
1850	14 (France, Britain, Austria, China ⁵² , Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the USA, Piedmont [Italy], Switzerland ⁵³ , the Netherlands)	6 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, Chile, Japan)
1900	25 (France, Britain, Austria, Argentine, China, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Spain, the USA, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Serbia, Chile, Japan)	19 (Australia, Vietnam, Egypt, India, Iran, Ireland, Canada, Korea, Cuba, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, the South African Union, Turkey, Uruguay, Finland, Philippines, Iceland)

The overall dynamics of the number of mature states are presented in Diagram 2:

⁴⁸ A mature state analogue according to the first author of this article.

⁴⁹ A mature state analogue according to the first author of this article.


⁵⁰ A mature state analogue according to the first author of this article.

⁵¹ It may be maintained that with the Napoleonic conquests in Italy and the formation of a united Italian state (first a republic, and then a kingdom – under the French protectorate) Italy began to move rather fast towards mature statehood. We believe that the transition of a number of Italian states (Venice, Florence, Genoa) to developed statehood had already taken place in the 15th century, but because of constant wars, invasions, internal influences, instability of interstate borders and states themselves the political development of Italy slowed down in subsequent centuries.

⁵² A mature state analogue according to the first author of this article.

⁵³ According to the second author of this article, before the 1840s the political system of Switzerland represented an alternative form to the developed state, whereas it was transformed directly into the mature state in the 1840s, as a result of the suppression of the *Sonderbund* rebellion.

Diagram 2. Dynamics of the Mature States' Number
(1500–1900 CE)



Mature state transformation in the 20th century

The mature state phase is connected with the formation of classes of entrepreneurs and workers, and the **development of the class-corporate state**. For the mature European states this process was completed approximately by the late 19th century. The first author of this article has already expressed the idea that the fuller the legal equality of human rights, the weaker the borders between social classes that tend to get disintegrated into smaller and less consolidated groups: strata, factions, *etc.* (for more detail see Гринин 1997а: 61–62). This occurred in Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Such a transformation of the mature state is connected with very fast changes in production and related spheres, including acceleration of migration processes, creation of conveyor production, explosive growth of the education subsystem, the service spheres, women's employment, and so on (on some of these processes see, *e.g.*, Маршалл 2005: 23). Suffice to mention that the world industrial production grew between 1890 and 1913 four times (Соловьев, Евзеров 2001: 280).

The most important features of the new social structure are as follows:

- formation of the so called middle class that gradually became numerically dominant (Фишер 1999: 89);

- growth of the importance of such factors of social stratification as education, and an increase in social mobility (Фишер 1999: 91). Consequently, the proportion of "white collar" workers grew in the most significant way;
- growth of the importance of social legislation and the laws limiting social polarization (such as the ones introducing high income taxation, inheritance taxation and so on)⁵⁴;
- growth of the importance of such factors that were not significant before on the national/pan-state level (though they could have been rather important at the level of smaller social units): gender, age, and professional group characteristics.

During the 20th century social policy experienced radical changes. We can observe the **transformation of the class state into the social state, that is the state that actively pursues a policy to provide support for poor, socially unprotected groups and that places limits on the growth of inequality**. This process started in the late 19th century, it became visible after the First World War, and it produced salient results after the Second World War⁵⁵. Actually, the whole of the first half of the 20th century can be characterized as a period of struggle for the introduction of the most important social laws. The respective views and ideologies were changed dramatically by the global social and economic events: revolutions, the example of the USSR, the world economic crisis and so on. Later this course was strengthened and developed until Western European and other developed countries became "welfare states" (on this dynamics of social development see Фишер 1999: 335–351). Immense changes took place in the sphere of income redistribution. This was achieved, in particular, through the progressive income taxation (see, e.g., Фишер 1999: 86–87) and social welfare programs for low-income groups. As a result of the development of social programs the taxation rates grew significantly in comparison with the period of classical capitalism (reaching 50% and more of personal incomes)⁵⁶.

When in the 1950s and 1960s the USA and a number of European countries became **welfare states/mass consumption societies**, this implied that the mature state had acquired some features that were not typical of its earlier version, and that a new form of state had developed.

⁵⁴ In the last decades of the 20th century in some developed countries the lower class shrank to 5%, the upper class constituted less than 5% of the total population, whereas the rest of the strata could be attributed to the middle or lower-middle classes (see Фишер 1999: 89), whereas in the early 19th century up to two thirds of the total population belonged to the lower class (*ibidem*).

⁵⁵ In some cases the first laws of this kind were already passed in the 19th century. In particular, in Germany the first social insurance laws were passed under Bismarck (Григорьева 2001: 23, Пагрущев 2001: 76; Гриневиц 1999: 17). In Britain the first social insurance (in particular, pensions) laws were already begun to be passed in the early 20th century (see Пономарев 2003: 171).

⁵⁶ They only began to be reduced since the 1980s in connection with the introduction of the neoconservatist course (that corrected the previously dominant Keynesian one) into the economic policies of a number of the leading states, such as the USA, Britain and so on. In particular, in the USA in 1986 the upper limit of personal income taxation was reduced from 50 to 28%, whereas the maximum rate of taxes on the corporations' profits was reduced from 46 to 34 % (Повалихина 2002: 434).

In the 1960s new changes in all spheres of life (especially in connection with the new [information-scientific] production revolution) began. In particular, one could mention the growth of the role of various non-class social movements in the Western countries (student, youth, race, "green", women movements, consumers' organizations and so on). The class characteristics became more and more vague, among other things through the dispersion of ownership (see, e.g., Dahrendorf 1976), whereas the social structure became determined more and more not only by economic ownership, but by other parameters, including education and popularity.⁵⁷ We believe that all these features cannot be regarded as characteristic of the mature state; the same can be said about enormous social guarantees provided to the commoner population.

There are a number of interesting features that are not characteristic of the typical mature states. The most salient among them is a perfectly new and very important phenomenon – a partial renunciation by many states of their sovereignty as regards the determination of their internal taxation, customs, coercive and social policy, their right to wage wars and so on, due to their voluntary joining of regional and global organizations, the recognition of the priority of international law over national law (for more detail see Гринин 1999; 2004a; 2005). It is also necessary to note the formation of various supranational organizations and the growth of their importance.

Thus, many present-day characteristics of the Western states cannot be regarded unconditionally as the ones of the mature state. Hence, since the 1960s and 1970s the United States and the leading European states (Germany, France, states of Northern and Northwestern Europe) could be regarded as *transitional* mature states, within which some traits of the future supranational, suprastate political forms emerge (for Japan and some European countries not mentioned above this is relevant since the 1980s and 1990s). This implies that they have some features that are not characteristic of the state as a form of political organization. That is why there are certain grounds to expect that the end of the period of the mature states is forthcoming, and the world is entering a phase of its new (suprastate and supranational) political organization (for more detail see Гринин 1999; 2003a: 159–165; 204–206; 234–235).

In this respect the simultaneity of the change in the basic features of the mature states and the radical changes in the world demographic dynamics observed in the recent decades (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a) do not appear coincidental.


Finally, let us analyze the dynamics of the territory controlled by developed and mature states and their analogues.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Парсонс 1997: 27; Берпр 1994. The works of the first author of this article provide an analysis of the contemporary social processes, in particular those connected with the so-called "celebrities" (Гринин 1997а: 50; 2003а: 220–222; 2004б; 2004в).

A preliminary mathematical analysis of the dynamics of the territory controlled by developed and mature states and their analogues

A general picture of this dynamics up to 1950 can be presented as follows (see Diagram 3):

Diagram 3. Dynamics of Territory Controlled by the Developed and Mature States and Their Analogues (millions km²), till 1950




NOTE. The dynamics of territory controlled by developed and mature states (and their analogues) have been determined on the basis of Tables 1 and 2 above in conjunction with Taagapera's database (Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997), the *Open History* database⁵⁸ (<http://www.openhistory.net>), as well as the *Atlas of World History* (O'Brien 1999).

These dynamics are described rather well ($R = 0.835$, $R^2 = 0.697$, $p < 0.001$) by an exponential model (see Diagram 4):

⁵⁸ This database has been developed by us with financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project # 06-06-80459a).

Diagram 4. Dynamics of Territory Controlled by the Developed and Mature States and Their Analogues (millions km²), till 1950: correlation between predictions of linear and exponential models and empirical estimates



NOTES. Black markers correspond to empirical estimates. *Linear regression:* $R = 0.566$, $R^2 = 0.343$, $p < 0.001$. The thin light grey best-fit line has been generated by the following equation: $X_t = 14.3038 + 0.0118t$. The best-fit parameters here and elsewhere have been determined with the least squares method. *Exponential regression:* $R = 0.835$, $R^2 = 0.697$, $p < 0.001$. The thick dark grey best-fit curve has been generated by the following equation: $X_t = 2.4422 \times e^{0.0018t}$. In order to make the exponential regression possible we ascribed to the period preceding the formation of developed states (and their analogues) the value of 0.0001.

At first glance, a high correlation between the empirical estimates of the variable under consideration and the exponential model does not appear to be coincidental. Indeed, one may suppose the presence of a positive feedback between the territory controlled by the developed states and the rate of the developed statehood territorial expansion (the larger the territory controlled by the developed state, the more resources it will have at its disposal; hence, the higher the territorial expansion rate⁵⁹). This statement can be expressed mathematically in the following way:

⁵⁹ This is, for example, the logics of the exponential model of the world political centralization dynamics suggested by Taagapera (1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997). In addition to this, one should take into account the factor of cultural influence, the borrowing of the developed states' technolo-

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = kX , \quad (1)$$

where X is the territory controlled by the developed states. As is well known, such differential equations have a solution of the following form:

$$X_t = a \times e^{bt} . \quad (2)$$

However, one may suppose that expansion rates of developed statehood (naturally, if a vast periphery not yet controlled by the developed statehood is available) depend not only on the size of controlled territory, but also on the level of the development of statehood itself, that is on the level of the development of political technologies (T):

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = aTX . \quad (3)$$

On the other hand, in order to describe mathematically the dynamics of political technology development one may apply Kremer's general equation⁶⁰ describing technological dynamics:

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = bNT . \quad (4)$$

Let us recollect that in this equation N denotes the total number of people – potential innovators – within the respective system. With respect to the equation describing the political technology development dynamics N should be interpreted as the number of potential agents of political technology innovations, *i.e.*, the professional administrators. Further assume that the number of agents of the state apparatus is proportional to the territory controlled by the state organization (the larger the territory, the higher the number of state agents necessary to administer it). Hence,

gies in religious, political, military, production and other spheres, as well as modernization processes that both facilitate the developed/mature states' expansion and accelerate the early states' transformation into developed states (as was observed, for example in East and South-East Asia, or Europe in the 2nd millennium CE. It should also be taken into account that military activities conducted by developed/mature states against other polities can contribute to the expansion of the developed state type. This is so not just in case of the developed states' victories, but in the case of a prolonged struggle the necessity to counteract a developed state could lead to the start of the modernization of a country that lacks developed statehood, whereas in case of a developed state's victory some elements of developed statehood tend to be borrowed by the defeated state. However, the time lag between the fall of developed states and the rise of new ones could be rather long, which is clearly evidenced by the 1st millennium record.

⁶⁰ The justification for this equation can be found in the following publications: Kremer 1993; Podlazov 2004; Tsirel 2004; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b.

$$N = cX . \quad (5)$$

By inserting equation (5) into equation (4), we obtain

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = k_1 XT , \quad (6)$$

where $k_1 = cb$.

Thus, we arrive at the following system of equations:

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = aTX , \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = k_1 XT . \quad (6)$$

Hence,

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = \frac{k_1}{a} (aXT) = \frac{k_1}{a} (aTX) = \frac{k_1}{a} \frac{dX}{dt} ,$$

consequently,

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = k_2 \frac{dX}{dt} , \quad (7)$$

where $k_2 = \frac{k_1}{a}$.

Hence, T can be expressed through X in the following way:

$$T = T_0 + k_2 X . \quad (8)$$

Inserting equation (8) into equation (3), we obtain

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = aTX = a(T_0 + k_2 X)X = aT_0 X + ak_2 X^2 ,$$

and, taking into consideration that $k_2 = \frac{k_1}{a}$,

$$ak_2 X^2 = a \frac{k_1}{a} X^2 = k_1 X^2 ;$$


hence,

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = aT_0X + k_1X^2. \quad (9)$$

Thus, if the assumptions above are correct, the general dynamics of the size of the territory controlled by the developed and mature states and their analogues should be not exponential, but rather hyperexponential, and should be better described by a hyperbolic rather than exponential model.

Indeed, the hyperbolic model demonstrates a much better fit with the empirical estimates (see Diagram 5):

Diagram 5. Dynamics of the Size of Territory Controlled by Developed and Mature States and Their Analogues (in millions of square kilometers), till 1950 CE: the fit between predictions of simple hyperbolic model and empirical estimates



NOTES: $R = 0.979$, $R^2 = 0.958$, $p << 0.0001$. Black markers correspond to empirical estimates. The solid grey curve has been generated by the following equation:


$$X_t = \frac{16260}{(2080-t)^2}.$$

Parameters C (16260) and t_0 (2080) have been calculated with the least squares method.

We would like to emphasize that this model only describes the general trend of the variable's dynamics, whereas a more accurate mathematical description of these dynamics should also take into account the evident cyclical component, which, however, is beyond the scope of this article.

To start a preliminary analysis of the fine structure of these dynamics (that will be continued in the next article of this Almanac) it makes sense to consider these dynamics in logarithmic scale (see Diagram 6):

Diagram 6. Dynamics of the Size of Territory Controlled by Developed and Mature States and Their Analogues (in millions of square kilometers), till 1950 CE (**logarithmic scale**)



As we can see, this diagram detects essentially the same system of attractors and phase transitions that was found in the previous article with respect to the world urbanization dynamics. A more detailed study of the relationship between the dynamics of the two variables will be performed in the next article of this Almanac.

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